Jamie Dimon has warned Britain’s new chancellor that raising taxes on banks could cost the country finance jobs, bringing one of the global banking industry’s most influential executives directly into the debate over how the UK government should fund its spending plans.

The JPMorgan Chase chairman and chief executive delivered the warning during a telephone conversation with Chancellor John Healey, according to reports published on August 17. Dimon argued that heavier taxation could weaken investment, encourage banks to allocate jobs elsewhere and undermine the government’s efforts to accelerate economic growth. He pointed to New York, where he believes a comparatively high tax burden has contributed to a decline in the city’s share of financial-sector employment.

The call was described as one of Healey’s introductory conversations with senior bank executives after he became chancellor in July. A person familiar with the exchange told the Guardian that Dimon’s observations were not confined specifically to Britain and that the JPMorgan chief was the first of several banking leaders expected to speak with Healey. The discussion nevertheless carried immediate significance because speculation is mounting that banks could face an additional charge in the government’s first budget, scheduled for October 28.

No windfall tax or increase in the existing bank surcharge has been announced. The discussion is taking place as Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s government considers how to finance cost-of-living support and other policy commitments without breaching fiscal rules. Banks have emerged as a potential source of revenue because higher interest rates have supported earnings across much of the sector, even as households have faced larger mortgage payments and elevated living costs.

Campaigners estimate that a windfall levy could raise substantial sums, although the result would depend on its design, duration, tax base and the behavioral response of affected institutions. The Guardian reported that one proposal could yield as much as £19 billion. The Trades Union Congress has separately called for the existing corporation-tax surcharge on bank profits to be raised from 3% to at least 8%, estimating that such a change could generate about £9 billion over four years.

Paul Nowak, the TUC’s general secretary, rejected Dimon’s argument and said banks should make a larger contribution while profits, dividends and bonuses remain strong. The labor organization has linked its proposal to measures that would ease energy costs and support public services. That position reflects the political appeal of directing a tax increase toward a concentrated and profitable industry rather than imposing broader charges on households or businesses.

The banking industry disputes the premise that lenders are lightly taxed. UK banking groups are subject to the standard 25% corporation-tax rate and an additional 3% surcharge on qualifying profits above an allowance. They can also face the bank levy, a charge introduced after the global financial crisis and assessed primarily against certain balance-sheet liabilities and equity. Employers additionally pay national insurance contributions, while the industry’s highly compensated workforce generates significant income-tax receipts.

HM Revenue & Customs guidance illustrates the combined statutory burden. For certain unassessed transfer-pricing profits of a banking company in 2026, the applicable rate can reach 34%, comprising the 25% corporation-tax rate, the 3% banking surcharge and a separate 6% charge under the relevant rules. That example is not a general effective tax rate for every bank or every category of profit, but it demonstrates how sector-specific measures can layer on top of ordinary corporation tax.

The broader financial-services sector contributed £43.3 billion in UK taxes in the financial year ended in March 2025, according to figures cited by the Guardian. Banks argue that the full contribution should be considered when the government assesses competitiveness, particularly because employment and payroll taxes form an important part of the total. Critics respond that the sector’s public support during the financial crisis and its recent earnings justify maintaining or increasing special charges.

Dimon has opposed Britain’s post-crisis bank taxes for years. In an interview earlier in August, he said he had always considered the surcharge unfair to JPMorgan because the US lender was not responsible for the UK banking failures that prompted extraordinary public intervention. The charge, initially presented in the political context of repairing the damage caused by the crisis, has remained part of the tax system more than a decade later.

His latest message was framed less as an immediate ultimatum than as a warning about cumulative decisions. Banks routinely evaluate where to place trading operations, technology staff, risk functions and senior executives. Tax is only one consideration, alongside regulation, access to clients, labor costs, infrastructure, legal certainty and the availability of specialized employees. Over time, however, even modest differences can affect where expanding businesses create their next group of jobs.

That mobility makes financial services different from industries whose factories or physical resources are more difficult to relocate. An international bank can expand a desk in Paris instead of London, assign a regional mandate to Frankfurt or shift selected activities to New York without formally leaving Britain. The result may appear gradually through slower hiring and investment rather than through a single, highly visible relocation announcement.

For the Treasury, that creates a difficult revenue calculation. A higher rate can increase receipts from profits that remain within the tax base, particularly in the first years after a change. The longer-term yield may be smaller if banks alter legal structures, recognize more income in other jurisdictions or redirect future investment. The government must assess those behavioral effects against the need for dependable revenue and the political case for asking highly profitable institutions to pay more.

JPMorgan’s own presence makes Dimon’s comments especially consequential. The company has operated in Britain for more than a century and maintains extensive investment-banking, markets, payments, asset-management, consumer-banking and technology activities in the country. Its scale means decisions affecting even a small portion of the group’s workforce or investment budget could have a noticeable impact on London’s financial ecosystem.

The bank is also considering a new headquarters in Canary Wharf that has been valued at about £3 billion. Dimon previously indicated that the project could be reconsidered if the government adopted what the company viewed as a persistently hostile approach to the banking industry. A headquarters project has a long planning and construction horizon, so the decision would incorporate expectations about tax, regulation, infrastructure and London’s ability to remain a leading global business center for decades.

JPMorgan has simultaneously continued to demonstrate its commitment to the UK and continental Europe. In April, it expanded its Security and Resiliency Initiative across Europe, building on a previously announced intention to extend the program to Britain. The initiative is designed to facilitate financing and investment in areas including advanced manufacturing, defense, energy resilience, critical technologies and pharmaceuticals. JPMorgan reported $4.9 trillion in assets as of March 31, underscoring its capacity to influence capital allocation across markets.

The headquarters question gives the tax debate a tangible investment benchmark, but the consequences extend beyond one company. London competes with New York as a global center and with Paris, Frankfurt, Dublin, Amsterdam and other European cities for regional functions. Brexit complicated cross-border market access and led many institutions to establish or enlarge European Union operations. London retained formidable advantages in talent, language, law, time-zone coverage and financial infrastructure, yet the redistribution gave banks more operational flexibility to assign future growth outside the UK.

The government must also consider the health of Britain’s domestic capital markets. London has struggled with a shortage of major initial public offerings, takeovers of listed companies and decisions by some businesses to seek primary listings elsewhere. Bank taxes do not directly determine where companies list their shares, but the policy debate contributes to perceptions of whether the UK offers a stable and internationally competitive environment for financial activity.

Dimon’s reference to New York is intended to emphasize this competitive dynamic. The city remains one of the world’s dominant financial centers, but jobs and business functions have spread to lower-cost US locations and other jurisdictions. Taxes are among the factors behind that dispersion, though remote work, technology, operating expenses, regulation and corporate efforts to place employees closer to customers have also contributed. The comparison therefore offers a warning rather than a direct forecast of what would happen in London.

Supporters of additional taxation argue that the mobility risk can be overstated. Large banks need access to London’s deep labor pool, institutional investors, professional services and market infrastructure. Relocating regulated operations can be costly and may require approvals, new systems and changes to client relationships. From that perspective, the government has room to collect more revenue without triggering an immediate or proportionate departure of jobs.

They also contend that recent bank profitability is linked partly to monetary conditions rather than solely to greater efficiency or innovation. Rising interest rates can widen the difference between what lenders earn on loans and what they pay depositors, although competition for savings and changes in funding costs eventually compress that benefit. A temporary windfall tax is presented as a means of capturing a portion of unusually strong earnings without permanently changing the sector’s underlying tax structure.

Banks respond that profits are cyclical and provide capital needed to absorb losses, lend through downturns, invest in technology and meet regulatory requirements. A levy introduced near the top of the earnings cycle can remain in place after conditions weaken, as Dimon’s criticism of the post-crisis surcharge illustrates. They also warn that uncertainty itself can be damaging because boards may delay investment while waiting to understand future costs.

The distinction between a one-time windfall tax and a permanent surcharge increase will be critical. A narrowly defined, temporary levy could generate near-term revenue while limiting the long-run change in marginal tax rates. It could nevertheless create concern that exceptional taxes will recur whenever profits rise. A permanent surcharge increase would be easier for companies to model but would more directly affect the comparative return on locating capital and income in Britain.

Tax design would also determine which institutions bear the cost. A charge focused on domestic interest income might fall most heavily on retail and commercial lenders, while a broader profit surcharge could affect international investment banks with substantial UK operations. Allowances, treatment of losses and interactions with existing levies would influence both the revenue raised and the competitive impact on smaller banks and market entrants.

Healey’s budget challenge extends well beyond banking. The chancellor must reconcile the administration’s planned cost-of-living measures, devolution agenda and increased defense expenditure with limited fiscal headroom. Economists have warned that adhering to existing borrowing rules may require higher taxes, spending reductions or a combination of both. That makes concentrated sources of revenue politically tempting, even where the economic effects are uncertain.

Financial markets will judge the budget on more than the headline tax package. Investors will watch the credibility of revenue estimates, the treatment of public spending and the government’s willingness to maintain predictable rules. A measure that raises money but damages investment sentiment could work against the growth assumptions supporting the fiscal plan. Conversely, ruling out additional bank taxes without identifying replacement revenue could intensify questions about how new commitments will be financed.

The exchange between Dimon and Healey marks the opening stage of that negotiation rather than its conclusion. The chancellor is expected to consult other bank chiefs, who are likely to deliver similar arguments about competitiveness and policy stability. Their views will be weighed against unions, advocacy groups and lawmakers seeking a larger contribution from the industry.

Until the government publishes a proposal, estimates of revenue and job losses remain scenarios rather than settled outcomes. The clearest signal from Dimon is that JPMorgan will treat tax policy as an investment variable. For Healey, the decision is whether the immediate fiscal and political benefits of a higher bank levy outweigh the risk of progressively shifting some of London’s most valuable employment and capital allocation to rival financial centers.